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Affiliating versus Subcontracting: 
The Case of Multinationals 
Abstract 
An aspect of globalization that has attracted increased attention in recent years is intra-firm 
trade. Actually, an intra-firm trading relationship indicates that an affiliate is present in the 
partner country. Hence, distinguishing intra- and extra-firm dimensions gives us access to 
the boundaries of multinationals and consequently to their policies of development. More 
precisely, the paper aims at determining factors of the trade-off faced by multinationals 
between affiliating and subcontracting a relocated segment of production or distribution, 
using microdata on intra- and extra-firm bilateral trade of affiliates located in France. First, 
a microeconomic model is developed. The idea is to compare the profit made by a 
multinational if trade occurs within it with that made if trade occurs with another firm. On 
the one hand internalization may generate additive fixed costs, on the other it may enable 
the multinational to keep its comparative advantage gained through the development of 
firm-specific assets. The model is then empirically validated. The advertising intensity and 
the technological level of production are notably associated with intra-firm trade and thus 
with internalization. Actually, both brand and quality are shown to be profit accelerators in 
the event of affiliating. Essential means of product differentiation, these two factors are 
enough for multinationals to cover the additive fixed costs generated by internalization 
when the market becomes sufficiently large. 
Keywords:    boundaries of multinationals, intra-firm trade, product differentiation 
 
Filialisation ou sous-traitance ? 
Le cas des groupes multinationaux 
Résumé 
Le développement du commerce international intra-groupe est un des aspects importants 
de la globalisation. La réalisation d’un échange intra-groupe indiquant la présence d’une 
filiale dans le pays concerné, séparer les dimensions intra- et extra-groupe permet 
d’appréhender le contour des groupes multinationaux et donc d’analyser leur politique de 
développement. Plus précisément, l’objet de cet article est de déterminer les facteurs 
intervenant dans l’arbitrage entre filialiser et sous-traiter - à l’international - un segment de 
production ou de distribution. Un modèle microéconomique est d’abord élaboré. L’idée est 
de comparer le profit réalisé par le groupe en cas de filialisation à celui réalisé en cas de 
sous-traitance. Si l’internalisation engendre vraisemblablement un coût fixe plus élevé, elle 
peut en revanche permettre au groupe de conserver un éventuel avantage comparatif 
acquis grâce au développement d’actifs spécifiques. Ce modèle est ensuite validé sur le 
plan empirique, à l’aide de données sur les échanges intra- et extra-groupe réalisés par les 
filiales de groupes multinationaux situées en France. Le niveau technologique de la 
production et l’effort publicitaire sont en particulier corrélés positivement avec le commerce 
intra-groupe et, par voie de conséquence, avec l’internalisation. La qualité et la marque 
jouent en fait un rôle d’accélérateur de profit en cas de filialisation. Moyens essentiels de 
différenciation des produits, ces deux facteurs permettent alors de contrebalancer le 
surcroît de coût fixe engendré par l’internalisation, du moment que le marché dépasse une 
certaine taille critique. 
Mots-clés :  contour des multinationales, commerce intra-groupe, différenciation des 
produits 
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Introduction 
Over the past few decades, international trade has increased markedly. This trend is a 
visible facet of the increasingly strong integration of the goods and services markets. 
Multinationals have contributed to this general movement in a prominent way. 
According to the figures given by the Industrial Statistical Survey Department (SESSI), 
they now account for about three quarters of French foreign trade. Analyzing their 
strategy of development is therefore a prerequisite for understanding the most 
important patterns of international trade. 
Firms can fragment their production around the globe in order to benefit from lower 
factors-costs or other locational advantages. Firms can also set up abroad in order to 
conquer new markets. Both strategies induce an increase in the number of trading 
relationships between affiliates
1. When the first strategy is pursued, intra-firm trade in 
intermediate goods occurs. Indeed, materials or components pass through a 
sequence of plants located in different countries before a finished product is delivered 
to consumers. Affiliates are thus vertically linked through trade in intermediate inputs. 
When the second strategy is pursued, intra-firm trade in intermediate or finished 
goods occurs. Firms may conquer new markets either by replicating production lines 
or by setting up commercial plants there. Affiliates are thus horizontally linked through 
trade in complements of range. 
Distinguishing intra- and extra-firm dimensions when analyzing international trade is 
important for two reasons. First, intra-firm trade often represents a consequent share 
of foreign trade for a given country. In the French case, a third of exports and a 
quarter of imports go on inside the same firm. Second, intra-firm trade is far more 
“captive” than extra-firm trade, since it stems from investments and technical or 
commercial choices that the firm cannot call into question overnight (Hannoun and 
Guerrier, 1996). Intra-firm trade is thus less sensitive to the variations of economic 
variables such as exchanges rates or customs duties
2. 
Moreover, an intra-firm trading relationship indicates that an affiliate is present abroad, 
in the country involved. Distinguishing intra- and extra-firm dimensions gives us 
access to the structure of multinationals and consequently to their policies of 
development. More precisely, it allows us to analyze the trade-off faced by 
multinationals between affiliating and subcontracting the relocated segment of 
production or distribution. This method of analysis enriches the usual empirical 
approach based on foreign direct investment data
3. 
Theoretical research on multinationals emphasizes the idea that production or 
distribution will be internalized for goods that embody specialized or proprietary 
knowledge. Actually, repeated studies have found that the development of 
multinationals is associated with the existence of knowledged-based, firm-specific 
assets (Horstmann and Markusen, 1989). These notably include technical expertise 
gained through research and development (R&D) expenditures and product reputation 
or identification gained through advertising expenditures. Such assets constitute 
essential means of product differentiation and may consequently give multinationals 
some monopoly advantage. Consider now a firm wishing to sell goods embodying 
knowledge-based assets in a foreign market. The transaction can certainly be done at 
arm’s length. But in this case the firm may have to transfer some of its knowledge to a 
foreign distributor, thereby losing - at least in part - its monopoly advantage (Ethier, 
1986). 
                                                       
1 In this paper, the word “affiliate” describes equally well a parent or a subsidiary company. This word is thus 
applied here to all elements of a multinational. 
2 See Clausing (2002) for an econometric evidence for the case of exchanges rates. 
3 See Caves (1982) for a survey of the usual approach.   4
Empirical research on intra-firm trade provides general support for the idea described 
above that transactions will be internalized for goods that embody specialized or 
proprietary knowledge (Borga and Zeile, 2003). Intra-firm trade is indeed found to be 
strongly associated with the R&D intensity of industries or firms in many studies
4. 
Moreover, goods differentiated through technology are first intended for markets 
where consumers enjoy a high standard of living. Intra-firm trade in such goods is 
therefore positively related to the per-capita income of the host country (Anderson and 
Fredriksson, 2000). 
In this paper, microdata from SESSI’s 1999 “globalization” survey are used in order to 
analyze the trade-off faced by multinationals between affiliating and subcontracting a 
relocated segment of production or distribution. Section 1 provides an overview of 
these data. The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a 
microeconomic model formalizing the main determinants of the trade-off. Broadly 
speaking, the idea is to compare the profit made if trade occurs within the firm with 
that made if trade occurs with another firm. On the one hand internalization may 
generate additive fixed costs, on the other it may enable the firm to keep its monopoly 
advantage gained through the development of specific assets. The model is then 
empirically put to the test. Section 3 provides the results and concludes. These 
confirm the economic intuitions embodied in the model. The standard of living of 
consumers, the technological level of production and the advertising intensity are 
notably associated with intra-firm trade and thus with internalization. Actually, the 
structure of multinationals is molded first by their will to get into position on market 
niches, through product differentiation. 
                                                       
4 See Lall (1978) for the U.S. case, and Zejan (1989) for the Swedish case.   5
I - Overview of the data 
Trade of multinationals is analyzed with the help of the “globalization” survey carried 
out in 1999 by the SESSI. It provides data on the intra- and extra-firm bilateral trade of 
affiliates located in France, by product, according to the three-digit Economic 
Summary Classification (NES 114)
5. It compiles data on international industrial firms 
whose customs flows exceed one million euros. International industrial firms are 
multinationals having at least one industrial affiliate, whatever its location. The 4,367 
respondents are all affiliates located in France. Slightly more than half the affiliates 
questioned have replied. In the end, the sample covers about 60% of France’s exports 
of goods and 40% of corresponding imports. 
Trade with joint ventures is small compared to intra- and extra-firm trade (see table 1). 
Hence, from now on, trade with joint ventures is mixed with intra-firm trade. 
Table 1: Values and shares of exports and imports handled by the respondents, by type 
of trade 
 
Notes:  Values are given in billions of euros. Shares are shown in parenthesis. 
Since business registration numbers (SIREN) are given, data compiled in the 
“globalization” survey can be matched with those of French administrative files. The 
following yearly databases will be useful later: the exhaustive file of balance sheets 
(BRN), the “business” survey (EAE) and the “financial connections” survey (LIFI). For 
each company, these contain such information as turnover, number of employees, 
sector of activity, advertising expenditures and majority interests in other companies. 
 
I.1 Geographical features according to the type of trade 
The charts below present the geographical distribution of exports and imports handled 
by the respondents, by type of trade (see figure 1). Two observations deserve to be 
mentioned: 
•  Trade is primarily made with developed countries. This dissymmetry is 
emphasized for intra-firm trade. In other words, affiliating is more likely to 
occur in a developed country than in a developing country. The next part 
examines this point in more detail. 
•  The share of intra-firm to global trade is slightly higher with European 
countries (67%) than with the United States (64%). It seems in other 
words that for a given level of economic development, the closer a country 
is, the more likely affiliating is. This point is furthermore corroborated when 
focus is placed on Europe (see figure 2). Trade with Denmark, Portugal or 
East European countries is equally intra- and extra-firm, unlike trade with 
closer countries which is mainly intra-firm. Affiliating thus seems to be 
positively related to proximity and particularly to geographical proximity. 
                                                       
5 See appendix 3 for a detailed description of this classification.   6









Notes:  The area of the circles is proportional to the value of corresponding trade (scale on the bottom 
left). Trade with European countries has been aggregated and it is represented by a hollow circle. 
 
I.2 Features of traded goods according to the type of trade 
For a given traded good, the tables hereafter respectively present the share of intra-
firm to global imports and the share of intra-firm to global exports (see table 2). A high 
value, close to 1, means that the good is mainly traded between two affiliates of a 
same multinational. Trade in high value-added, finished products (for instance video, 
radio, television or computer and related activities) is more likely to be intra-firm than 
trade in raw materials (mining of coal and lignite), foodstuffs (beverages or meat), 
intermediate products (man-made fibres) or low value-added, finished products (wood 
or glass products). 
Affiliating thus seems to be positively related to value-added. The latter usually 
increases with production technology. Arguably, goods traded with developing 
countries embody less technology on average than goods traded with developed 
countries. This point therefore corroborates the observation made in the preceding 
part, and attests a differentiation of commercial strategies according to the nature of 
traded goods. Trade in intermediate goods may arise from a strategy of vertical 
integration, whereas trade in finished goods may arise from a strategy of horizontal 
integration.   7










Table 2: Relative shares of intra-firm imports and exports, by product   8
I.3 Geographical features according to the nature of traded goods 
The charts hereafter present the geographical distribution of exports and imports 
handled by the respondents, by nature of product (see figure 3). Intermediate and 
finished goods are identified according to the criterion devised by Feenstra and 
Hanson (1996) and employed by Biscourp and Kramarz (2003). If the respondent is 
an industrial affiliate, then only the product with which the affiliate achieves most of its 
turnover is identified as a finished good. If the respondent is a commercial affiliate, 
then every traded product is identified as a finished good
6. 
Trade is primarily made in finished goods. This dissymmetry is emphasized for 
exports. Finished goods are exported all over the world, whereas intermediate goods 
are nearly entirely exported to the European countries and the United States. Imports 
originate mainly from these two areas as well. However, the oil-producing countries 
and Southeast Asia respectively account for a quite considerable part of the imports of 
intermediate and finished goods. 
Figure 3: Values of bilateral exports and imports, by nature of product 
Exports in finished goods 
 
Exports in intermediate goods 
 
Imports in finished goods 
 
Imports in intermediate goods 
 
Notes:  The area of the circles is proportional to the value of corresponding trade (scale on the bottom 
left). Trade with European countries has been aggregated and it is represented by a hollow circle. 
                                                       
6 It is thus assumed that all commercial affiliates supply finished goods to local consumers. By the way, it is 
worth noting that many commercial affiliates belong to the car industry.   9
II - Microeconomic method of analysis 
This section is devoted to the microeconomic modeling of the trade-off faced by 
multinationals between affiliating and subcontracting a relocated segment of 
production or distribution. First, a theoretical model is developed, taking into account 
the stylized facts shown in the preceding section. The model is inspired by those 
developed by Antràs (2003) and Helpman and al. (2003). It is conditional on the 
existence of a trade flow. In other words, the model does not explain why there is a 
trade flow, but why the latter is intra- or extra-firm. Second, a concrete example is 
given in order to show how to use the model. The focus is on a French firm wishing to 
supply a finished good entirely produced in France to a foreign market. Third, a 
reduced form of the model is developed, ready for an econometric validation. The 
dependent variable is a binary variable, identifying either an intra-firm or an extra-firm 
trade flow. The explanatory variables relate to characteristics of the partner country, 
the traded good and the multinational involved in a given trade flow. 
 
II.1 A theoretical model 
Consider an economy where a finished good Y  is produced in quantity  y . The 
demand function is assumed to be as follows: 
ε ε κ
− = Rp p y ) (
* , 
with  R ,  p  and ε  respectively representing the income of consumers, the price of 
good Y  and the elasticity of substitution between the latter and an alternative good. 
Finally, κ  represents preference given by consumers to good Y  in comparison to the 
alternative good. 
Consider now a firm having a monopoly on the production of the good Y . The firm 
knows the inverse demand function  ) (y p  and hence is able to maximize its profit. It 
should be noted that fixed costs of production FC  may occur. However, they do not 
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with  a  representing the marginal cost of production. This cost can be explicitly 
specified as a function of the costs of the production factors. Assume that the finished 
good  Y  is produced from n  inputs used in quantity  ) ,..., ( 1 n z z  at the exogenous 
prices  ) ,..., ( 1 n z z  and that the production follows a Cobb-Douglas function with 
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R r R . 
This profit is an increasing function of the preference κ  given to good Y , the income 
R  of consumers and the technology level Α  of the firm. On the other hand, the profit 
is a decreasing function of the costs  i r  of the production factors. Overall, the effect of 
an additive investment in R&D on the profit, including fixed costs, is ambiguous. If the 
investment may increase the technology level Α , it may increase fixed costs FC  as 
well. 
 
II.2 A concrete example of use 
From now on, three production factors are considered: capital K , labor L  and an 
intermediate input  X . The entire sequence of production and distribution of the 
finished good Y  is described in the diagram hereafter (see figure 4). Since the 
“globalization” survey only gives information about trade flows recorded by the French 
Customs service, no flow of capital or labor can be observed. A trade flow must 
furthermore link two different countries, one of them being France. A trade flow 
observed in (1) indicates the conversion of the intermediate input  X  into the finished 
good Y . A trade flow observed in (2), (3) or (4) indicates the place where the finished 
good is supplied. Actually, eight cases must be distinguished. They are identified 
according to the following criteria: the direction of the trade flow (import or export), the 
nature of the traded good (intermediate or finished) and the nationality of the firm 
involved (French or foreign). Fortunately, analyzing only one of these eight cases is 
enough. 
Figure 4: Entire sequence of production and distribution of the finished good 
Notes: The  indices  A , B  and C  denote three different countries. The indices U  and V  denote two 
countries belonging to {} C B A , , . The exponent D  - for distribution - denotes that the final 
good Y  is ready to be sold. 
Each arrow indicates a factor flow. The latter can go in, come out or stay within the firm. 
Consider the case of a French firm wishing to supply the finished good Y  to a foreign 
country. Let  A and B  denote France and the foreign country respectively. The good 
Y  is assumed to be entirely produced in France: 
France A V U = = = .   11
A trade flow is thus observed in (3). Remember that the model is conditional on the 
existence of this trade flow. In other words, the model does not explain why the firm 
has decided to conquer this foreign market, but how the firm attempts to conquer it, 
either by subcontracting the marketing of the finished good to a local firm or by setting 
up a commercial affiliate there. The resulting export is extra-firm in the first case, intra-
firm in the second. 
The idea is to compare the profit made by the French firm when marketing is affiliated 
with that made when marketing is subcontracted. The firm should then choose the 
conquest strategy that gives the highest profit. On the one hand, internalization may 
generate additive fixed costs, because of an increase in overheads
7. On the other, it 
may enable the firm to keep its comparative advantage gained through the use of 
specific assets. The firm may indeed take advantage of a finer knowledge of the local 
demand to better meet the requirements of consumers or to reduce the delivery time 
(quality effect). The firm may also benefit from returns to scale as regards advertising 
or marketing expenditures (brand effect). Actually, three supplementary parameters 
have to be introduced: 
•  τ  denotes the total transport cost of the traded good. It includes the 
freight and insurance costs and the customs duties paid to country B . 
The marginal production cost is assumed to increase proportionally to the 
total transport cost. Let us thus divide the technology level Α  of the firm 
by the total transport cost τ . 
•  ξ  denotes a quality factor arising from internalization. In the case of a 
relocated segment of production, the affiliate may for instance benefit from 
the technical expertise gained by the firm. Let us thus multiply the 
technology level Α  of the firm by the quality factor ξ . 
•  γ  denotes a brand factor arising from internalization. In the case of a 
relocated segment of production, the affiliate may for instance benefit from 
the product reputation gained by the firm. Let us thus multiply the 
preference κ  given to good Y  by the brand factor γ . 
When marketing is subcontracted, the sum of the profits earned by the firm and the 
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The exponents  A and B  are referring to the countries the parameters relate to. 
When marketing is affiliated, the firm may keep its comparative advantage gained 
through brand and quality. On the other hand, its profit is cut down by the cost of 
purchase of the subcontractor. The latter is assumed to be equal to  ST π
8. Finally, the 





















κ γ ε π π , , ,
1
1
, 1 , , . 
 
                                                       
7 This increase is likely to depend on the openness to foreign direct investment of the partner country. 
8 The cost of purchase is thus equal to the discounted sum - over one period - of the present and future 
profits of the subcontractor.   12
































Arguably, the parameters ξ  and γ  should be positive as well as the difference 
between the fixed costs  I FC  and  E FC
9. If the latter is held true, then the preference 
κ  given to good Y , the income R  of consumers and the technology level Α  of the 
firm are positively related to the decision of affiliating. On the other hand, the total 
transport cost τ  and the costs  i r  of the production factors are positively related to the 
decision of subcontracting. The paper aims precisely to prove these results. Hence, no 
restriction on the sign of the parameters ξ , γ  and  E I FC FC −  is assumed. 
It should be noted that profit taxation is assumed to play no role in the trade-off 
equation. Actually, the trade-off between affiliating and subcontracting is easily shown 
not to depend on profit taxation, assuming that the latter occurs in the country where 
multinationals originate from (residence based taxation). Unfortunately, although in 
many countries the legal basis of taxation is on a residence basis, in practice the vast 
bulk of the international taxation of company equity income is on a source basis 
(Devereux, 2004). In other words, tax is generally levied according to some notion of 
where the profit is generated. In this case, the trade-off between affiliating and 
subcontracting is again shown, under reasonable assumptions, not to depend on profit 
taxation (see appendix 1). 
 
II.3 An econometric method of validation 
In order to empirically validate the trade-off equation, a set of econometric tests is 
developed. Remember that eight cases must be distinguished. They are identified 
according to the direction of the trade flow (import or export), the nature of the traded 
good (intermediate or finished) and the nationality of the firm involved (French or 
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Before specifying notation, it is worth noting that the unit of observation is the triplet 
(firm involved, partner country, traded product). Indeed, the decision of affiliating or 
subcontracting a relocated segment is certainly made at the firm level. However, the 
“globalization” survey compiles data at the company level. It is thus necessary to 
aggregate the registered trade flows at the firm level. 
Consider a given international industrial firm. If several of its affiliates located in 
France export the same good to the same country, then the corresponding trade flows 
are aggregated. Such an aggregation sometimes leads to mixed observations, i.e. 
observations mixing intra- and extra-firm trade flows. Actually, a fifth part of 
observations is mixed. 
                                                       
9 By the way, it is worth noting that the total transport cost τ  affects the trade-off provided that the fixed 
costs  I FC  and  E FC  are not equal.   13
Since the trade-off faced by the firm is only between affiliating and subcontracting, 
mixed observations have to be allocated amongst intra- and extra-firm observations. 
From now on, all mixed observations are assumed to be intra-firm. A mixed 
observation indeed indicates the existence of an affiliate in the partner country
10. 
Finally, the dependent variable is a binary variable, identifying either an intra-firm or an 








i θ  if intra-firm trade is null (subcontracting). 
The following explanatory variables are supposed to replicate at best the parameters 
of the trade-off equation. They can be classified in three categories. 
1.  Those relating to the partner country i
11: 
•  i LGDPPC , the logarithm of the GDP per capita, 
•  i TECH , an index of its technological development, 
•  i LDIST , the logarithm of distance between it and France, 
•  i TARIFF , the average customs duties it applies for the manufacturing 
sector. 
2.  Those relating to the finally produced good  j : 
• 
j NESFG , its dummy according to the three-digit classification NES 114. 
3.  Those relating to the firm k  involved
12: 
• 
k ADPE , the ratio of the advertising expenditures to the number of 
employees in France. 
                                                       
10 An other method could have been to allocate mixed observations to intra-firm observations only if the 
share of intra-firm to global trade flows was higher than 0.5. However, this method is arbitrary because of 
the pricing difference between intra- and extra-firm trade flows. The former is priced through transfer 
pricing, the latter through market pricing. 
11 Except distance data, these variables are taken from the World Development Indicators published by the 
World Bank. The index of technological development is the share of high technology to global exports. 
12 Advertising expenditures and the number of employees are compiled at the company level respectively in 
the “EAE” and “BRN” databases. Their aggregation at the firm level is made with the help of the “LIFI” 
database (see section 1).   14  15
III - Results and findings 
The table below gathers the results of the eight econometric tests (see table 3). 
Overall, the results validate the trade-off equation. Indeed, all correlations either have 
the expected sign or are not significative. The interpretation of these results focuses 
on the crucial role played by product differentiation in the trade-off faced by 
multinationals between affiliating and subcontracting a relocated segment of 
production or distribution. Robustness of the correlations is tested in the appendix 2. 
Table 3: Results of the econometric tests 
Notes:  If the correlation is positive, then the higher the variable is, the more likely affiliating is. If the 
correlation is negative, then the higher the variable is, the more likely subcontracting is. “ns” means 
that the correlation is not significative at the 5% threshold. 
 
The crucial role of product differentiation 
In the case of exports, it can be assumed that the GDP per capita is a proxy of the 
income  R  of consumers inhabiting the partner country. Affiliating is thus associated 
with the income of consumers: the higher the GDP per capita is, the more likely 
affiliating is. This relation is predicted by the trade-off equation provided that the joint 
effect of quality and brand factors is positive: 
() () 1 1 1
1 > + +
− ε ε ξ γ . 
In the case of imports in intermediate goods, it can be assumed that the GDP per 
capita is a proxy of the labor cost  L r . Indeed, since there is little differentiation on the 
market of intermediate goods, firms seek as a priority to be supplied with intermediate 
inputs at the lowest cost. Subcontracting is thus associated with the labor cost: the 
higher the GDP per capita is, the more likely subcontracting is. This relation is 
predicted by the trade-off equation provided that the preceding inequality is true. The 
case of imports in finished goods is analyzed at the end of the section. 
It can be assumed that the geographical distance with the partner country and, in the 
case of exports, the average customs duties applied by the latter for the 
manufacturing sector are a proxy of the total transport cost τ . Subcontracting is thus 
associated with the total transport cost: the higher the geographical distance or the 
customs duties are, the more likely subcontracting is. Since the joint effect of quality 
and brand factors is shown to be positive, this relation is predicted by the trade-off   16
equation provided that the fixed costs in the event of affiliating are heavier than those 
in the event of subcontracting: 
E I FC FC > . 
Hence, internalization generates additive fixed costs, presumably because of an 
increase in overheads. By the way, it is worth noting that the preceding relation is 
weaker for trade in intermediate goods than for trade in finished goods. Actually, it can 
be assumed in the former case that the cost  X r  of the intermediate input - instead of 
the marginal production cost - increases proportionally to the total transport cost. Let 
us thus multiply the cost  X r  of the intermediate input by the total transport cost τ . 
The trade-off equation is then as follows: 
() ()
()
() () E I X L K E I FC FC r r r R
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, 
with  1 0 < < X ω . 
Since the exponent associated with the total transport cost is now smaller, the 
correlation is smaller as well. This is particularly visible for imports. 
The index of technological development of the partner country indicates the 
technology level its inhabitants are accustomed to. In the case of trade in finished 
goods, it can be assumed that this index is a proxy of the “country” dimension of the 
technology level Α  of the firm. Affiliating is thus associated with the technology level 
of the firm: the higher the index of technological development is, the more likely 
affiliating is. This relation is predicted by the trade-off equation provided that the 
quality factor is positive: 
0 > ξ . 
In the case of trade in intermediate goods, the preceding interpretation is certainly still 
valid, but it is not so straightforward. The corresponding correlations are lower for that 
matter. 
The positive relation between the probability of affiliating and the technology level of 
production is borne out by the analysis of the coefficients associated with the product 
dummies. The latter are generally higher when associated with finished goods with 
high value-added than when associated with finished goods with low value-added
13. 
Finally, the quality factor is shown to play an accelerator role: the profit, excluding 
fixed costs, earned by the firm increases more with the degree of product 
differentiation gained through technology in the event of affiliating. 
For a given firm, the ratio of the advertising expenditures to the number of employees 
in France indicates its advertising intensity. It can be assumed that this ratio is a proxy 
of the preference κ  given to the good Y  the firm produces. Affiliating is thus 
associated with the preference given by consumers to the firm: the higher the 
advertising intensity is, the more likely affiliating is. This relation is predicted by the 
trade-off equation provided that the brand factor is positive: 
0 > γ . 
                                                       
13 The coefficients associated with the product dummies are given in the appendix 3.   17
The preceding interpretation holds equally true for both trade in finished goods and 
trade in intermediate goods. Indeed, there is a specific form of advertising intended for 
firms, through notably trade fairs (Genthon, 2001). Finally, the brand factor is shown to 
play an accelerator role: the profit earned by the firm, excluding fixed costs, increases 
more with the degree of product differentiation gained through advertising in the event 
of affiliating. 
Brand and quality are essential means of product differentiation, gained through the 
development of knowledge-based, firm-specific assets. The use of such assets may 
allow multinationals to strengthen their market share on segments with high value-
added. Multinationals would then rather internalize the sequence of production or 
distribution. Indeed, both brand and quality are shown to be profit accelerators in the 
event of affiliating. Now, these two factors are enough for multinationals to cover the 
additive fixed costs generated by internalization when the market becomes sufficiently 
large. In other words, the structure of multinationals is molded first by their will to get 
into position on sufficiently large market niches. 
Such market niches can only be reached through product differentiation. In the case of 
imports in finished goods, the GDP per capita has to be interpreted in this way. If the 
imported good is produced by a foreign firm, then its degree of differentiation on the 
French market is positively related to the economic development of the partner 
country. Awareness given by consumers to this feature may play a crucial role (Horst, 
1972). On the other hand, if the imported good is produced by a French firm, then the 
feature has no more grounds to play such a crucial role. The preceding relation is 
therefore weaker. Actually, the GDP per capita denotes - in this case - a demand 
effect existing among the French consumers: the appeal of product differentiation for 
them.   18
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Appendix 1: Taxation and the trade-off 
 
 
This appendix is devoted to the role taxation plays in the trade-off between affiliating 
and subcontracting. Consider as in section 2.2 the case of a French firm wishing to 
supply a finished good, assumed to be entirely produced in France (country  A), to a 
foreign country B . The before tax profit earned by the firm is as follows: 
•  E ST E FC − − Π = π π
0  in the event of subcontracting, 
•  I ST I FC − − Π = π ρ π




















κ ε π  and  () ()
1 1 1
− + + =
B B ε ε ξ γ ρ . 
 
A. Residence based taxation 
Let us assume that profit taxation occurs in the country where the firm originates from. 
The after tax profit earned by the firm then amounts to
14: 
•  () ( ) E ST A E FC TR − − Π − = π π 1
1  in the event of subcontracting, 
•  () ( ) I ST A I FC TR − − Π − = π ρ π 1
1  in the event of affiliating, 
where  A TR  is the French statutory tax rate
15. 
Hence, the firm should decide to affiliate the relocated segment of distribution when: 
() ( ) () ( )
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 E I E I A A E I FC FC TR TR π π ρ π π ≥ ⇔ − − ≥ Π − − ⇔ ≥ . 
In other words, the trade-off between affiliating and subcontracting does not depend 
on profit taxation provided that the latter is residence based. However, most often, 
international taxation of company equity income is on a source basis, i.e. tax is 
generally levied according to some notion of where the profit is generated. 
 
B. Source based taxation 
Let us assume that profit taxation occurs in the countries where the profit is generated. 
When marketing is affiliated, the total profit of the French firm is therefore partly taxed 
                                                       
14 For the sake of simplicity, let us assume from now on that all profits are positive. 
15 It is worth noting that the cost of purchase of the subcontractor remains equal to  ST π  or, in other words, 
that it does not depend on taxation. Actually, the after tax profit earned by the subcontractor is equal to 
() ST B TR π − 1 . The French firm has thus to pay  ST π  in order to buy the subcontractor. In this case, 
the after tax profit earned by the former owner is indeed equal to () ST B TR π − 1  as well.   20
in the foreign country B , at the statutory tax rate  B TR . In this case, the after tax profit 
earned by the firm is as follows: 
( ) () () [] () I ST B A I FC TR TR − − Π − + − − = π ρ η η π 1 1 1
2 , i.e. 
()
0 0 2 ) ( 1 I B A I A I TR TR TR π η π π − + − = . 
On the other hand, the profit of the French firm remains entirely taxed in France when 
marketing is subcontracted: 
() ( ) E ST A E FC TR − − Π − = π π 1
2 . 
Since the French statutory tax rate is among the highest in the world, consider only 
the case where  B A TR TR > . The difference between the after tax profit earned by the 
firm in the event of affiliating and that in the event of subcontracting is as follows: 
() ( ) ()
0 0 0 2 2 1 1 E A I B A I A E I TR TR TR TR π π η π π π − − − + − = − , i.e. 
() ( ) ()
0 0 0 2 2 1 I B A E I A E I TR TR TR π η π π π π − + − − = − . 
Therefore, the additional gain stemming from the opportunity the firm is given to shift 
part of its profit from France to the country B  in the event of affiliating amounts to: 
()
0
I B A TR TR π η − . 
Two scenarios can then be considered: 
•  The firm decides, ex-ante, whether to affiliate or to subcontract marketing 
on the basis of the before tax difference 
0 0
E I π π − . Hence, the trade-off 
does not depend on taxation. Nevertheless, in the event of affiliating, the 
firm has an opportunity, ex-post, of increasing its after tax profit 
2
I π  by 
shifting part of its profit to the partner country. 
•  The firm decides whether to affiliate or to subcontract marketing direct on 
the basis of the after tax difference 
2 2
E I π π − . In other words, the firm 
takes into account, ex-ante, the opportunity it is given to shift part of its 
profit to the partner country in the event of affiliating. If  0
2 2 > − E I π π  and 
0
0 0 < − E I π π , then marketing is affiliated only because of this opportunity. 
Since tax legislations may always be changed, this scenario seems quite 
risky and is thus unlikely
16. 
Actually, incorporating statutory tax rates into the pool of explanatory variables leads 
to non significative results. The previous point is therefore corroborated. In the end, 
the trade-off between affiliating and subcontracting is again shown, under reasonable 
assumptions, not to depend on profit taxation when the latter is source based. 
                                                       
16 Indeed, the need to identify prices of goods and services exchanged across borders between affiliates 
leads to high compliance costs, and may well result in higher taxation if the relevant revenue authorities 
do not agree on the valuation. Actually, there is evidence that multinationals are increasingly moving 
towards treating their affiliates as profit centres, in which transfer prices are set to maximize operating 
profit, rather than to minimize taxes (Devereux, 2004).   21
Appendix 2: Results obtained from the 1993 survey 
 
 
This appendix is devoted to the robustness test of the results given in the paper. This 
test is made with the help of the Sessi’s 1993 “globalization” survey. Unfortunately, the 
latter gives less precise information than the 1999 survey. Some statistical alterations 
are thus necessary: 
•  The 1993 survey was carried out on the industrial affiliates and the 
commercial affiliates separately. For the latter, it provides data on their 
intra- and extra-firm trade only by geographical areas and only according 
to a two-digit classification. Therefore, the field of analysis is restricted to 
the industrial affiliates located in France. 
•  The industrial affiliates only had to fill in their intra-firm trade flows. The 
1993 survey thus gives no detail as regards extra-firm trade. Missing 
information can be retrieved from the database of the French Customs 
service. If for a given country and a given good a respondent indicates a 
non null share of intra-firm trade, then all corresponding flows recorded in 
the customs database are assumed to be intra-firm. This assumption is of 
no consequence. Indeed, the trade flows are next aggregated at the firm 
level and all mixed observations are assumed to be intra-firm again. 
•  The firm nationality is not mentioned in the 1993 survey. Therefore, only 
four cases can be distinguished. 
 
The table below gathers the results of the four econometric tests (see table A). 
Overall, the results bear out the trade-off equation. Indeed, all correlations either have 
the expected sign or are not significative at the 5% threshold. 
Table A: Results obtained from the 1993 survey 
 
Notes:  If the correlation is positive, then the higher the variable is, the more likely affiliating is. If the 
correlation is negative, then the higher the variable is, the more likely subcontracting is. “ns” 
means that the correlation is not significative at the 5% threshold. The average customs duties per 
country for the manufacturing sector are not available in 1993. 
   22
However, a few slight differences deserve to be mentioned. First, the income of 
consumers and the advertising intensity now impact on the trade-off more for the 
finished goods than for the intermediate goods. Second, the effect of the explanatory 
variables relating to the partner country is far greater than in 1999. Third, the structure 
of the trade flows analyzed is altered. Indeed, the share of intra-firm trade has 
considerably increased, passing from 9.5% in 1993 to 48.3% in 1999, as well as the 
share of trade in finished goods, passing from 23.9% in 1993 to 51.4% in 1999
17. 
Since the field of analysis in 1993 is restricted to the industrial affiliates, the last two 
results have to be interpreted with caution. 
                                                       
17 These figures are calculated by dividing the total number of trade flows by the number of trade flows 
concerned.   23
Appendix 3: Coefficients associated with the product dummies 
 
 
This appendix provides the coefficients associated with the product dummies defined 
in section 2.3. It should be noted as in section 3 that the coefficients are generally 
higher when associated with high value-added, finished goods. The dummies are 
defined according to the French Economic Summary Classification (NES). The latter is 
an aggregated double entry classification - economic activities and products - relevant 
for economic analysis purpose. 
Table B: Three-digit French Economic Summary Classification (NES 114) 
Code Heading Code  Heading 
B01  Production, processing and preserving of meat…  E34  Medical and surgical equipment… 
B02  Dairy products  E35  Industrial process control equipment… 
B03  Beverages  F11  Mining of metal ores 
B04  Grain mill products, starches and starch products…  F12  Other mining and quarrying 
B05  Other food products  F13  Glass and glass products 
B06  Tobacco products  F14  Ceramic goods, products for construction… 
C11  Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur  F21  Preparation and spinning of textile fibres… 
C12  Leather and leather products, footwear  F22  Textile articles, except apparel 
C20  Publishing, printing […] of recorded media  F23  Knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles 
C31  Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals…  F31  Wood and wood products 
C32  Soap and detergents, […], perfumes…  F32  Pulp, paper and paperboard 
C41  Furniture  F33  Articles of paper and paperboard 
C42  Jewellery and musical instruments  F41  Basic inorganic chemicals 
C43  Sports goods, games, toys and others n.e.c.  F42  Basic organic chemicals 
C44  Domestic appliances  F43  Agro-chemical products, paints… 
C45  Television and radio receivers…  F44  Man-made fibres 
C46  Optical instruments, photographic equipment…  F45  Rubber products 
D01  Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers  F46  Plastic products 
D02  Parts and accessories for motor vehicles  F51  First processing of iron and steel 
E11  Building and repairing of ships and boats  F52  Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 
E12  Railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock  F53  Casting of metals 
E13  Aircraft and spacecraft  F54  Industrial services for treatment of metals 
E14  Motorcycles, bicycles…  F55  Fabricated metal products 
E21 Structural  metal  products F56  Recycling 
E22  Tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal…  F61  Electrical equipments and apparatus n.e.c. 
E23  Machinery for the production and use of […] power  F62  Electronic valves, tubes… 
E24  Other general purpose machinery  G11  Mining of coal and lignite, extraction of peat 
E25  Agricultural and forestry machinery  G12  Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas… 
E26  Machine tools  G13  Mining of uranium and thorium ores 
E27  Other special purpose machinery  G14  Coke oven products and processing of nuclear fuel 
E28  Weapons and ammunition  G15  Refined petroleum products 
E31  Office machinery and computers  G21  Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 
E32  Electric motors, generators and transformers  G22  Collection, purification and distribution of water 
E33  Television and radio transmitters…     
Notes:  Only relevant economic activities or products are shown. Codes thus go from “B” to “G”, 
corresponding to industrial activities. 
 
The tables hereafter present the coefficients associated with the dummies relating to 
the finally produced good (see tables C and D). Intermediate and finished goods are 
identified according to the criterion devised by Feenstra and Hanson (1996). If the 
respondent is an industrial affiliate, then only the product with which the affiliate 
achieves most of its turnover is identified as a finished good. If the respondent is a 
commercial affiliate, then every traded product is identified as a finished good.   24
Table C: Imports 
Intermediate goods  Finished goods 
Foreign firm  French firm  Foreign firm  French firm 
Code Coeff. Code Coeff. Code Coeff. Code Coeff. 
C12 -1.33 B03 -1.43 F21 -0.54 F11  ns 
B05 -1.06 C42 -0.96 F12 -0.52 E14  ns 
B03 -0.91 B05 -0.64 F32 -0.51 G11  ns 
F44 -0.81 F31 -0.61 B05 -0.40 G14  ns 
F32 -0.81 E22 -0.59 G15  ns  F12  ns 
F51 -0.78 B04 -0.56 F51  ns  E21  ns 
E22 -0.76 B02 -0.54 F44  ns  F31  ns 
B02  -0.72  G21 ns F31 ns F32 ns 
C32  -0.64  G12 ns E14 ns C42 ns 
C41  -0.55  E14 ns B03 ns B04 ns 
F12  -0.53  F32 ns F42 ns F23 ns 
C11  -0.53  F23 ns B02 ns F55 ns 
F21  -0.49  F12 ns E25 ns F21 ns 
F53  -0.46  C12 ns E22 ns B05 ns 
F31  -0.36  E28 ns F52 ns F22 ns 
F55  -0.36  F14 ns B04 ns F33 ns 
F52  -0.36  C44 ns F23 ns E34 ns 
B04  -0.33  F55 ns F41 ns E23 ns 
F33  -0.29  C32 ns F22 ns C12 ns 
F41  -0.24  F22 ns C12 ns F41 ns 
E12 ns F54 ns E13 ns F52 ns 
F42 ns F44 ns E33 ns F44 ns 
C20 ns F13 ns F33 ns E25 ns 
E26 ns E21 ns C32 ns F42  0.34 
F46 ns E11 ns E11 ns F43  0.35 
F13 ns C31 ns E21 ns E24  0.36 
F54 ns E23 ns C42 ns E26  0.36 
C42 ns F51 ns E12 ns F46  0.37 
E25 ns E32 ns B06 ns B03  0.42 
E13 ns E25 ns E28 ns F14  0.43 
E32 ns F43 ns F46  0.27  C11  0.43 
F23 ns C41 ns E27  0.28  D02  0.47 
D01 ns C20 ns C43  0.28  C31  0.50 
E24 ns E34 ns D02  0.30  F51  0.51 
F43  ns  E27 0.35 C41 0.33 C41 0.52 
E14  ns  C11 0.38 C31 0.36 G15 0.54 
C43 ns F33  0.40  F61  0.36  D01  0.59 
F45  ns  E33 0.47 F62 0.39 B02 0.60 
E27  ns  D02 0.47 C11 0.39 C44 0.62 
C31  ns  F53 0.50 E24 0.39 C20 0.62 
D02  ns  E26 0.51 F55 0.39 E27 0.68 
G15  ns  F52 0.52 D01 0.39 E35 0.68 
F14 ns F56  0.58  F45  0.39  C32  0.68 
E33 ns E31  0.60  F13  0.40  C43  0.72 
F22  ns  E24 0.65 F43 0.40 E33 0.73 
E23 0.23 C43 0.66 E35 0.41 F13 0.77 
F61 0.27 E35 0.68 E26 0.42 E32 0.78 
F62 0.35 F46 0.69 E23 0.42 E11 0.79 
E35 0.38 F21 0.69 F14 0.46 C46 0.82 
C46 0.66 F61 0.76 E34 0.50 F62 0.84 
E34 0.68 F41 0.77 E32 0.53 E31 0.88 
F56 0.72 D01 0.79 C46 0.54 E13 0.95 
C44 0.77 F42 0.87 C20 0.64 E28 0.98 
E21 0.90 E12 1.07 C44 0.74 E22 0.99 
C45 1.15 G15 1.08 E31 0.79 F45 1.07 
E31 1.19 E13 1.15 C45 0.99 F61 1.09 
    F62 1.23 G14 1.12 G21 1.26 
   G14  1.29     E12  1.62 
   C46  1.58     C45  1.72 
   C45  1.76      
   F45  1.84      
Notes:  Coefficients associated with the dummies 
j NESFG  relating to the finally produced good  j . 
Since the grand total of the dummies adds up to 1, the value of the coefficients is of no interest. 
Only their ranking is informative. 
Codes are detailed in table B above. “ns” means that the coefficient is not significative at the 5% 
threshold.   25
Table D: Exports 
Intermediate goods  Finished goods 
Foreign firm  French firm  Foreign firm  French firm 
Code Coeff. Code Coeff. Code Coeff. Code Coeff. 
E13 -2.67 E22 -1.41 F21 -0.93 F44 -0.94 
B03 -2.13 F56 -1.14 G15 -0.88 E22 -0.53 
F12 -2.10 C42 -1.03 F51 -0.56 E28  ns 
F21 -1.56 E14 -0.92 F31 -0.54 G14  ns 
F32 -1.53 E28 -0.82 F32 -0.52 C42  ns 
F52 -1.52 F12 -0.70 B05 -0.42 F12  ns 
F53 -1.50 F52 -0.68 E21 -0.41 F32  ns 
F54 -1.14 F53 -0.65 F33 -0.41 E21  ns 
F51 -1.02 E23 -0.63 D01 -0.40 F21  ns 
B04 -0.86 E25 -0.63 B04 -0.39 E25  ns 
C32 -0.81 F54 -0.62 F41 -0.38 B05  ns 
B05 -0.73 B05 -0.60 E22 -0.36 E14  ns 
D01 -0.70 B02 -0.57 F12 -0.35 E11  ns 
E22 -0.68 E33 -0.50 F22 -0.31 E13  ns 
F33 -0.61 B04 -0.47 F52 -0.31 G11  ns 
D02 -0.61 E35 -0.47 C32 -0.29 G21  ns 
F45 -0.59 E21 -0.45 F55 -0.28 B06  ns 
F22 -0.57 E13 -0.40 F13 -0.26 F13 0.19 
E23 -0.55 F14 -0.38 C20 -0.25 B03 0.19 
F23 -0.53 E32 -0.37 F44  ns  B02 0.21 
E24 -0.51 G12  ns  E13  ns  F31 0.30 
F46 -0.49 F44  ns  D02  ns  F41 0.33 
C11  -0.48  F13 ns B03 ns F22  0.35 
E35  -0.48  F32 ns C46 ns F52  0.35 
F42 -0.45 F21  ns  F46  ns  E23 0.39 
F55 -0.45 F31  ns  C12  ns  E32 0.40 
F41  -0.44  C44 ns C43 ns D02  0.41 
E27  -0.43  G14 ns C41 ns F51  0.42 
F44 ns B03 ns E27 ns B04  0.43 
C20 ns F41 ns F61 ns F55  0.44 
F61 ns F51 ns E26 ns C20  0.45 
F31 ns F46 ns F14 ns F46  0.46 
C31 ns F22 ns C11 ns F23  0.49 
C41 ns D02 ns E14 ns E27  0.49 
F56 ns E34 ns F45 ns E24  0.52 
C12 ns F33 ns F23 ns E26  0.53 
F43 ns F43 ns E25 ns C41  0.58 
C44 ns F55 ns E34 ns C11  0.58 
F13 ns E24 ns F43 ns C44  0.63 
E25 ns E27 ns C45 ns E35  0.63 
E26 ns C45 ns E33 ns E33  0.65 
E33 ns C31 ns E24 ns E34  0.67 
E32 ns F62 ns F42 ns C43  0.72 
F62 ns F23 ns E23 ns F14  0.72 
E21 ns C11  0.43  E35 ns F43  0.75 
E12 ns C41  0.47  F62 ns C46  0.76 
E34 ns E31  0.51  C42 ns F33  0.77 
E14 ns F42  0.53  E11 ns C45  0.82 
C43  ns  C20 0.54 E28  ns  C12 0.86 
B02  ns  F61 0.57 G14  ns  F42 0.88 
G15  ns  E12 0.59 E31 0.26 D01 1.03 
E31 0.47 C32 0.65 E32 0.37 G15 1.04 
C46 0.60 D01 0.71 C31 0.45 C32 1.12 
F14 0.60 E26 0.72 C44 0.48 F62 1.13 
C45 0.86 E11 0.75 B02 0.72 F45 1.22 
C42 1.07 C43 0.81 E12 1.28 F61 1.29 
   F45  0.99     E12  1.30 
   C12  1.02    E31  1.30 
   G21  1.17     C31  1.48 
   G15  1.49      
   C46  1.55      
Notes:  Coefficients associated with the dummies 
j NESFG  relating to the finally produced good  j . 
Since the grand total of the dummies adds up to 1, the value of the coefficients is of no interest. 
Only their ranking is informative. 
Codes are detailed in table B above. “ns” means that the coefficient is not significative at the 5% 
threshold.   26
 